The 170-year-long debate in the medical literature about the ethics of prescribing placebos in medical therapeutics needs to be reevaluated in light of recent placebo research and improved understanding of the placebo effect as an integral part of the doctor-patient relationship. It has traditionally been assumed that deception is an indispensible component of successful placebo use. Therefore, placebos have been attacked because they are deceptive, and defended on the grounds that the deception is illusory or that the beneficent intentions of the physician justify the deception. However, a proper understanding of the placebo effect shows that deception need play no essential role in eliciting this powerful therapeutic modality; physicians can use nondeceptive means to promote a positive placebo response in their patients.
T H E DEBATE over whether it is ethical for physicians to prescribe placebos for patients has surfaced at intervals in the medical literature since the 19th century. Because traditional oaths and codes of ethics are silent on this issue, physicians taking a stand on placebo use have been unable to appeal to authority and have been prompted to develop original and often highly creative moral arguments. Although these arguments deserve review simply as an often-neglected feature of medical history, they also require critical reexamination in light of two recent developments. The first is the awakening of experimental interest in the placebo effect, and a gradual reconceptualization of placebo phenomena to recognize their pervasiveness as part of medical practice (1) . The second is the emphasis in contemporary medical ethics of individual rights and patient autonomy in the doctor-patient relationship (2) (3) (4) , leading to the rejection of many paternalistic assumptions previously thought to justify medical deception (5) .
Placebos and the Placebo Effect
"An empiric oftentimes, and a silly chirurgeon, doth more strange cures than a rational physician . . . because the patient puts his confidence in him," Robert Burton wrote in 1628 (6) , showing that at least by Renaissance times physicians appreciated the power of the imagination and expectation to change bodily states and to cure disease. In 1785 Benjamin Franklin led a commission to investigate Mesmer's animal magnetism and, in a series of elegant experiments, showed that the subjects' imagination was the most important factor in explaining the bizarre effects and miraculous cures attributed to that practice (7) . Physicians were not reluctant to take advantage of this phenomenon by prescribing medications thought to be pharmacologically inert when no specific remedy was indicated. Thomas Jefferson wrote to Dr. Casper Wistar in 1807, "One of the most successful physicians I have ever known, has assured me, that he used more of bread pills, drops of colored water, and powders of hickory ashes, than of all other medicines put together" (8) .
The contemporary era of placebo research began with the adoption of the double-blind controlled trial as the standard experimental method in the 1940s; subsequent findings on the placebo effect have been reviewed extensively (1, (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) . Whenever a supposedly inert treatment is used in an experimental situation, 30% to 40% of subjects can be expected to show some benefit from the placebo treatment (9) . The pattern of the response to placebo typically resembles the pharmacologic findings of active drug responses (14) . In one study of the effect of both clofibrate and placebo on cholesterol level and cardiovascular mortality, those control subjects who reliably took their placebos showed lower cholesterol and reduced mortality compared with their less compliant counterparts (15) . Placebo response is not limited to the patient's subjective experience; placebos alter laboratory values and other measures of objective physiologic change (16) . Although placebos are commonly thought of primarily as pain relievers, virtually all potentially reversible symptoms and diseases that have been investigated in double-blind studies show some response to placebo -including diabetes (17) , angina pectoris (18) , and malignant neoplasms (19) . Placebos can also cause many of the same side effects seen with active medication (20, 21) . For all these reasons it is impossible to use placebo response to distinguish between a real, organic symptom and a symptom that is "all in the patient's head," although the myth to the contrary still persists (22) .
From an early focus on attempting to elucidate the "personality type" of persons who react to placebos (which failed in part because the same person may respond or fail to respond to placebo in different circumstances [9] ), attempts to understand placebo phenomena have shifted to a broader approach to factors in the doctor-patient relationship, in the overall situational context, and in the cultural background (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) . It has become more clear that whatever happens when a patient gets better after ingesting a sugar pill also happens to some degree whenever the patient receives a pharmacologically potent treatment within a supportive healing relationship; that at least some of the symptom relief that follows administration of the active treatment arises from emotional and symbolic factors. That is, the placebo effect pervades much of medical practice even when no placebo has been used.
For example, when meprobamate, phenobarbital, and placebo were administered blindly to anxious patients, the two pharmacologically adtive drugs were clearly superior to placebo when administered by a physician who had confidence in the drugs' efficacy and who was viewed by the subjects as supportive; the drugs and placebo showed no difference when administered by a less supportive and more skeptical physician. Subjects of the first physician also showed more overall symptom relief (30) , It is reasonable to suspect, then, that when the family physician prescribes decongestants for a viral upper Respiratory infection, some of the patient's symptom relief is due to the pharmacologic action of the drug, but some is also due tiD the emotional support of the doctor-patient relationship, the doctor's confirmation and legitimization of the illness, and the reassurance that the symptoms do not represent something more serious than a bad cold.
Definitions
The expanded concept of the placebo effect just described makes it undesirable to have the definition of "placebo effect" totally dependent on the definition of "placebo," The following definitions may serve satisfactorily for our purposes: The placebo effect is the charige in the patient's condition that is attributable to the symbolic import of the healing intervention rather than to the intervention's specific pharmacologic or physiologic effects; a placebo is a form of medical therapy, or an intervention designed to simulate medical therapy, that is believed to be without specific activity for the condition being treated, and that is used either for its symbolic effect or to eliminate observer bias in a controlled experiment. It is worth recalling here that although the sugar pill is cited as the paradigrh case of placebo use, any medical treatment, including such diverse techniques as surgery (31) and biofeedback (32) , can function as a placebo.
Another useful distinction uses the terms "pure" and "impure" placebos, A pure placebo, such as a lactose pill or a saline injection, is totally without pharmacologic potency. An impure placebo has some pharmacologic properties, but these are not relevant to the current circumstances and the treatment is used solely for its psychologic effect. Common examples are thyroid, vitaniin B12, and penicillin, when used in patients who do not have hypothyroidism, pei-nicious anemia, or bacterial infections, respectively.
Placebos and Deception
iefferson said of the use of bread pills and drops of colored water in 1807, "It was certainly a pious fraud" (8) , Subsequent writers, including physicians, philosophers, and scientists, have adopted widely divergent positions on the ethics of giving placebos (33), All authorities, however, are agreed on one point-if there is an ethical problem in therapeutic use of placebos, the problem is that of deception. This agreement in turn arises from a shared assumption about how placebos are typically used in clinical practice, which will be called here the "traditional use" of placebos. In the traditional use. the physician administers a treatment known to him or her to be without pharrnacologic potency; but the physician either tells or allows the patient to believe that the treatment has such potency. It is further assumed in the traditional-use model that the patient's false belief in the potency of the treatment is essential for the placebo effect to occur (34) (35) (36) , Enough has already been said about the recently expanded concept of the placebo effect to call the traditional-use model into question on several counts. However, the bulk of the medical literature on the ethics of placebos accepts this model as a given. Hence, to do justice to most of tiie arguments offered by physicians for and against placebo use, the traditiorial-use model must form the point of departure, Ih a subsequent section, the ethical position that results from replacing the traditional model with the expanded concept will be considered.
It will be most convenient to survey first the arguments offered against placebo use, as these assume that deception is generally wrong, and that it is just as wrong (if indeed not worse) when encountered in medicine as when encountered elsewhere in life. Next, arguments in favor of placebo use can be investigated to see how successfully they defuse the deception issue.
Arguments Against Placebos
It is standard in modern writings on medical ethics to oppose placebo use because it represents a specific instance of the more general issue of patient deception (2, 3, 5, 37, 38), The value of avoiding deception is grounded in the more basic values of the autonomy and dignity of the individual patient. The basic idea is that of moral reciprocity. We generally wish that other people treat us in a manner that shows their respect for us as persons; and this entails that they not use manipulation or deception on us, even if they judge the results to be for our own good. If we are to regard our patients as our moral equals and to respect their dighity as persons, we are similarly prohibited from practicing deception or manipulation on them.
This line of reasoning is most at home in the context of a deontologic or duty-based ethical theory. Deception is condemned because it violates an a priori moral rule-a priori because the rule appeals to the very nature of our beings (that is, persons deserving respect) rather than to the good or bad consequences of our actions. Appeal to duty and to moral i-ule has always beeh a popular mode of argument. Thus one medical editor (39) wrote in 1885, "piiysicians , , , cannot always tell the plain truth to a patient without injuring him. It should be the rule of , , , life, however, to be straightforward and candid. Therefore, we say that placebos should be , , , rarely, if ever; prescribed," Describing the characteristics of the trustworthy and virtuous physician, the writer concluded, "We venture to say that such a man would not find it necessary to keep a polychromatic assortnient of sugar pills in his doset,"
This commentator explicitly rejects an argument frofn consequeiices-at times, indeed, being truthful may injure patients. But more basic than negative consequences is the a priori "rule of... life," which in the 19th century was closely tied to concepts of virtue and gentlemanly conduct, and hence truthfulness.
Other physicians, however, have been uncomfortable with a priori appeals and have preferred a utilitarian mode of argument, demanding to be shown that placebo use, generally applied, would lead to a net increase in unhappiness over happiness for all concerned. Among many adopting a utilitarian stand, the most articulate and forceful was Richard C. Cabot, best known today as originator of the clinicopathologic conferences of the Massachusetts General Hospital, but in his day an innovative writer on medical ethics as well as on medicine, and holder of the Chair of Professor of Social Ethics at Harvard University in addition to his medical appointment (40) . Cabot (41) rejected an a priori approach to issues of truth and falsehood-"you will notice I am not now arguing that a lie is, in itself and apart from its consequences, a bad thing"-but felt that the negative consequences of placebo use condemned the practice. The obvious short-range consequence occurred when the patient discovered the deception and lost trust in the physician. True, it was probable in any single case that the physician would not be found out; but Cabot (41) rejoined, "Is it good for us as professional men to have our reputations rest on the expectation of not being found out?" But Cabot (41) was much more concerned about the long range consequences of creating unhealthy public attitu'des toward medicine and medications:
The majority of placebos are given because we believe that the patient will not be satisfied without them. He has learned to expect medicine for every symptom and without it he simply won't get well. True, but who taught him to expect a medicine for every symptom? He was not born with that expectation. He learned it from an ignorant doctor who really believed it. . . . It is we physicians who are responsible for perpetuating false ideas about disease and its cure . . . and with every placebo that we give we do our part in perpetuating error, and harmful error at that.
Cabot elsewhere (42) stated even more bluntly, "Placebo giving is quackery." He concluded (41) that in general the negative consequences of placebo use outweighed the positive; but that placebos could be justified in some rare cases:
No patient whose language you can speak, whose mind you can approach, needs a placebo. I give placebos now and then . . . to Armenians and others with whom I cannot communicate, because to refuse to give them would create more misunderstandings, a falser impression, than to give them. The patient will think that I am refusing to treat him at all; but if I can get hold of an interpreter and explain the matter, I tell him no lies in the shape of placebos.
Another more recent commentator reflected on both the occasional justification for giving placebos, and the rarity with which such a case ought to arise: "Some patients are so unintelligent, neurotic, and inadequate as to be incurable, and life is made easier for them by a placebo." Then, paraphrasing an earlier commentator (43), he concluded: "It has been said that the use of placebos is in inverse ratio to the combined intelligences of patient and doctor" (44) .
In assessing the consequences of placebo use as a general policy, one should note the tendency of deception to multiply itself, and the need to cover up for the original lie. Prescribing placebos now involves insuring the complicity of the nurse, the pharmacist, and all other parties to the prescription. There is also the problem of setting a fee for the placebo prescription-if too high, them someone will appear to making an unjustified profit from deception; if too low, the deception may inadvertently be discovered. It may be more for such mundane reasons and not out of any increased ethical insight that the use of totally inert medicines like lactose pills has declined once physicians stopped dispensing their own drugs. In more recent times, fear of lawsuits may also have played a role.
Arguments for Placebos
Deceptive or not, placebos have in fact been widely administered by practicing physicians, and to many the fascinating power of the body to respond to purely symbolic interventions seemed too potent a therapeutic tool to pass up. A number of commentators have tried to give a formal justification for placebo use. Once again, two general moral approaches have been used. For the deontologist, the force of the moral rule against deception cannot be denied; so it must be argued either that the deception rule does not properly apply to the placebo case, or that other moral rules may mitigate it. The utilitarian may calculate all the good consequences attributable to placebos, and argue (or assume) that these outweigh the evils of deception. For each of these attempts at justification, however, the placebo opponents have had a ready and generally persuasive reply.
First, one may forthrightly deny that placebo use need involve deception by the physician. This position, while occasionally alluded to (45) , is seldom stated explicitly in the medical literature; but it is frequently encountered in debate and discussion among physicians. It is usually argued that if the physician tells the patient that a sugar pill is morphine or penicillin, he is guilty of an outright and unethical lie. But if he administers the pill with a noncommittal statement, such as, "This pill will make you feel much better," he has not deceived the patient; any false beliefs result from the patient's deceiving himself and are not the moral responsibility of the physician: "should a patient become suspicious . . ., the therapist need only give an honest evasion, rather than a lie" (36) .
Richard Cabot (41) attacked this and other arguments defending medical practices that mislead the patient by stating, "a true impression, not certain words literally true, is what we must try to convey." By way of fleshing out Cabot's objection, it may be acknowledged that what counts as deception may be dependent on the norms and expectations associated with particular social settings. For instance, when we go to the theater and see Mark Twain reading from Huckleberry Finn, we do not consider ourselves to have been deceived when we discover he is a cleverly made-up actor. We may then ask whether the clinical setting is one of those special social situations where creating a false impression by deliberate misdirection does not count as deception. Cabot appears to have assumed that a patient may reasonably expect in that setting that, if a drug or other treatment is given, it is selected for its pharmacoiogic potency for the patient's condition. It also seems reasonable to assume that the patient will not expect that the physician will specifically name the treatment-the patient is accustomed to receiving pills alluded to by the physician merely as "an antibiotic" or "a decongestant," but these remedies are still assumed by the patient to be pharmacologically potent. One may then conclude that if the physician prescribes an inert pill and conceals this from the patient by verbal misdirection, he has violated these legitimate patient expectations and is guilty of deception; the special nature of the clinical setting gives no license for creating a false impression in this manner.
Legal backing (46) for Cabot's argument comes with the characterization of the physician-patient relationship as a fiduciary one, in which one party assumes a special responsibility to look out for the best interests of the other. "Where a person sustains toward others a relation of trust and confidence, his silence when he should speak, or his failure to disclose what he ought to disclose, is as much a fraud in law as an actual affirmative false representation" (47) .
Still, the physician is not responsible for false beliefs the patient may bring into the encounter, if the physician has taken no action to cause those beliefs (48, 49) ; how far the physician's duty extends to dispel those false beliefs, if they do not lead directly to health-threatening behavior, is an interesting ethical question in itself. What is the physician's duty toward the patient who arrives with a firmly entrenched belief in the therapeutic and preventive powers of vitamins, and asks the physician to recommend a good daily vitamin supplement? This patient harbors a false belief, and energetic and prolonged discussion from the physician might mitigate or dispel it. But this reeducation seems hardly worth the effort, given the low probability of harm and the (presumed) low readiness of the patient to assimilate the new information. Thus the postulated duty not to create false beliefs in the patient by one's words or actions need not imply a more onerous duty to seek out and dispel all the false beliefs the patient may have acquired elsewhere.
Second, the placebo advocate may admit that placebos as traditionally used involve deception, but still insist that this use is ethically justified. Social practice recognizes a class of deceptions called white lies, which are felt to be essentially harmless because of their innocuous content and benign motivation (50) . Even if the special circumstances of medical practice do not automatically permit out-and-out deception, it still seems to be the case that many partial truths or euphemisms are appropriate. For example, proper supportive care of the cancer patient seeking some hope to mitigate the frightening diagnosis calls for a somewhat slanted presentation emphasizing the potential gains from therapy, not merely for a listing of the 5-year survival statistics.
But a problem in including placebos in the category of white lies is that what counts as a white lie is fairly well demarcated by social convention; otherwise anyone uttering a falsehood, however blatant, could excuse his act by claiming it was "only a white lie." Members of society are thus in effect forewarned about this practice and, if they choose to ask their friends how their new hats or ties look on them, they can be said to have given at least implied consent to any white lie that results. By contrast, the traditional-use model assumes that knowledge of the lie will be restricted to the medical profession, lest placebos lose their effectiveness with wider publicity. Recipients of the so-called white lie are therefore systematically excluded from any knowledge of the existence of this practice, and they have no opportunity to challenge questionable uses of placebo deception by reference to generally accepted social norms and limits. This would make placebo use morally suspect in a way that the usual white lies are not.
Leslie (51) attempted to justify placebo deception in a similar fashion: "There is a fine line of distinction between the words, deception and deceit . . . deceit implies blameworthiness whereas deception does not necessarily do so . . . ." Leslie emphasized the benign intent of the physician and offered as an analogy a magician practicing sleight of hand to entertain an audience. But Bok (50) has emphasized that the supposedly benign intent of the person doing the lying, and the expected value of the resulting benefits, often look very different from the perspective of the person being lied to. The audience choosing voluntarily to witness the magician's performance can weigh for themselves the degree of deception, the intent, and the value of the benefits; the patient in the traditional-use model of placebos is denied this opportunity. (It may in fact be argued that the magic show is not "deception" at all, as any reasonably well informed person knows what goes on at such events and is not fooled in any substantive way.) Thus, Leslie is either merely asserting that some deceptions are justified and others are not, without giving any arguments to prove that placebos belong in the justified category; or else his "fine line" between deception and deceit is so fine as to escape attention altogether.
All this discussion of justified and unjustified deception, however, may seem pointless to the pragmatic physician who adopts the traditional use of placebos merely because it can benefit the patient. By this pragmatic view, either the physician's duty not to deceive is of no moral concern at all, or else it is far outweighed by the much stronger duty to benefit the patient-a duty which, Veatch (38) has argued, has dominated the so-called Hippocratic ethical tradition in medicine to the unwarranted exclusion of other, equally rational moral considerations. This view has gained added impetus since the recent wave of research described above, showing the extent and frequency of placebo responses. The pragmatic approach has been further bolstered by research linking the placebo response to endorphins (52) . Because endorphins function primarily in analgesia, and because, as was noted above, the placebo response is not limited to pain, this endorphin research really provides a very limited ac-count of the physiologic means by which placebos may exert their effects. But to the uncritical medical mind, the identified biochemical basis for some placebo responses has somehow made the whole placebo issue suddenly respectable, (Shapiro [53] discovered in an informal survey that negativism toward placebo use among physicians correlated with greater age, private rather than academic practice, and nonparticipation in clinical research,)
In this setting, the placebo advocate may attribute, rightly or wrongly, several false beliefs to the person who argues against placebo use. The opponent of placebos may be thought to believe: that placebos really do not work, or work only for a limited number of medical conditions; that some pharmacologically active remedy exists for all conditions, so that the doctor who prescribes a placebo is automatically withholding the "correct" drug; or that any treatment that works by psychologic mechanisms is thereby inferior to a treatment that works by biochemical means. As we saw, ethical concern over placebos does not depend on ariy of these false assumptions, yet placebo opponents are still sometimes labeled as if their arguments ran conti-ary to modern scientific medicine. It may have been a mistaken attribution of these false beliefs that led a distinguished investigator of the placebo response (54) to characterize as "oft-quoted but fatuous" one of the better recent papers (55) offering arguments of the sort first used by Cabot, One could, of course, offer a utilitarian counter-attack to Cabot (41) and contend that he had miscalculated the likelihood and the Severity of the various consequences of placebo use. But any balanced view of the pros and cons makes this a remote possibility. First, if past studies are reliable, only 30% to 40% of patients will respond to placebo positively. Second, even though lactose can be expected to have fewer toxic effects than active drugs, placebo side effects and even addiction do periodically occur. Finally, even if one rejects these considerations, one is still left with the long-range consequences Cabot predicted-a public conditioned to look for the cure for all ills in a bottle of medicine, and to neglect prevention and a healthy life-style in favor of a medical quick fix.
But most pragmatic authors do not even attempt a balanced utilitarian consideration. If anything, they are content with a crude risk-benefit ratio: Anythirig that benefits the patient is good; placebos have been shown in scientific trials to benefit patients; therefore, placebos should be used, at least in selected sorts of cases. A frequent hidden assumption is that the only harm worth considering in this crude pragmatic calculus is direct physical harm such as that due to a toxic drug reaction. Less tangible harms-^risks to doctor-patient trust, unhealthy views about drug-taking, and decreased opportunity for the patient to make choices about his own care-are simply left out of the equation (34, 36, 43, (56) (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) (63) (64) (65) , The nature of the risk-benefit calculus is further illustrated by those authors who list specific contraindications or limitations for placebo use (33, 34, 51) , for instance, the concern that overuse of placebos will lead to diminished diagnostic vigilance (57) or that the placebo-treated patient will be more resistant to definitive psychotherapy (66) , Placebo use may thus be cautiously endorsed because of its success, without raising ethical qualms:
I knew a surgeon years ago who thought nothing of performing an oblique lower right quandrant incision, then suturing without entering the abdominal cavity in patients who had emotional problems manifested by pain in the abdomen. His results were excellent and as one might expect his operative mortality and morbidity were exceptionally low, , , , Certainly this is not common and I doubt whether anyone else would have done such procedures. However, I am certain that thousands of appendectomies and hysterectomies are done yearly as placebos. In retrospect, though at the time I was horrified at what he had done, and still am aware of the possible grave consequence, I am inclined to admire his courage (63),
The unnecesSary-surgery argument indicates that the less scientifically-inclined physician may inadvertently use therapy that actually can benefit the patient only through the placebo effect. One may then argue that it is better for the physician to use a pure placebo rather than an impure placebo. Prescribing pure placebos at least promotes full knowledge (for the physician, at least) of the approach being taken; impure placebos promote unscientific medicine and expose the patient to increased risk of toxic reactions (43, 57, 60) , If deception is involved in the case of the pure placebo, it applies to only one person, namely, the patient, for the physician knows that the agent is devoid of all but psychotherapeutic properties. But when we use [an impure placebo] there is the danger of deceiving two people, , , , The doctor may come to think that the agent has potency when, in fact, it has none. That danger is real , , , (67) Other authors are vaguely concerned about the deception issue but feel it to be merely a semantic problem: "If placebo therapy is regarded as a form of deception, then, of course, an ethical dilemma arises. , , . What is needed is a redefinition of placebo or nonspecific effects in psychologic or psychotherapeutic terms" (27) , "If we give patients a placebo as an honest psychotherapeutic device, we can be considered fulfilling [our] primary responsibility" (63) , But just because a substance is used for its symbolic properties does not eliminate the possibility of morally blanieworthy deception:
We like to think that our patients bring us their symptoms and problems for our consideration, expecting thoughtful and honest advice. With , , , the declining influence of the Church, the doctor's value to the community as an impartial and educated adviser has become as important as the priest's used to be. The placebo is a form of deception and a betrayal of trust equivalent to the sale of bottles of ditchwater as water of the River Jordan (44), There is, however, another form of defense for placebos that does not look at a weighing of the good and bad consequences, but rather at the nature of the iniplied expectations in the doctor-patient relationship. Placebo use is unjustified if the patient's proper expectation is "that the physician will give me the chance to be informed about the treatment"; but not if the expectation is "that the physician will choose on my behalf the treatment most likely to help," Thus it is argued that placebo use "does not amount to deception of the patient who trusts the doctor to order whatever he considers is most likely to be of benefit" (45) , There is nothing illogical about an expectation that gives the physician this extensive a blank check. But it is unlikely that most patients have such an expectation, at least in modern times, and specifically in relation to placebos. On the contrary, the indignation with which most people respond on learning they have received placebo surreptitiously is strong evidence against any widespread acceptance of this much paternalism. An individual patient, of course, may negotiate such an arrangement with his or her physician; but that hardly justifies the blanket attribution of paternalistic expectations to patients generally.
An Alternative Position: Placebo Effect Without Deception
Of all the positions above, opposition to placebo use unless there are especially strong extenuating circumstances in a specific case is ethically most sound; the other positions either evade the deception issue or fail to disarm its legitimate force. But one must recall that all of these arguments assume the traditional-use model, which holds that the deception is an essential ingredient for successful placebo treatment. The considerations noted at the beginning of this paper, however, based on newer placebo research and appropriate redefinition of the terms "placebo effect" and "placebo," point the way to an effective separation of deception and the placebo effect in clinical practice. Once deception is eliminated (and not merely glossed over) the ethical problem is defused.
One excellent and commonplace example of nondeceptive use of placebos occurs in properly designed doubleblind research with informed consent. The research subject is ignorant as to whether he or she is actually receiving placebo or the experimental drug; but he or she has been fully informed of the experimental design, about the use of placebos in the study, and about the risks and benefits associated with the design. If free consent is given based on that information, no deception has occurred and all the criteria for ethical research have been met. Unfortunately there are a few experiments, more commonly occurring in social science research, where deception about the nature of the experimental design is essential if the data are to be valid. Whether and with what consent arrangements such studies may be ethically conducted requires additional analysis (68),
The first empirical rejection ofthe traditional-use model of the placebo response was a nonblind placebo trial (69), Thirteen of 14 psychiatric outpatients with somatic symptoms who completed a week's trial of sugar pills, having been openly informed that they were sugar pills and that many patients experienced relief with such medication, experienced objective symptom reduction. Such a study, of course, has severe limitations, and this work has not been replicated. But a more recent survey of placebo therapeutics gives several case reports of successful placebo therapy in patients who were openly informed that they were receiving pharmacologically inert substances (70) , Furthermore, Norman Cousins (71), in describing the response of his mysterious connective tissue disease to a combination of high-dose ascorbic acid, laughter, and positive thinking, commented, "It is quite possible that this treatment-like everything else I did-was a demonstration ofthe placebo effect," Here is anecdotal testimony that a well-informed patient may be aware of the mental or symbolic effect of a therapy and still experience major bodily changes.
Whereas possibilities for nondeceptive use of placebos are theoretically intriguing and are of some limited clinical applicability, the nondeceptive use of the placebo effect has much more important practical implications, because some element of the placebo effect exists in every clinical encounter even when no placebo is used (1, 23, 25, 28, 29) , An analysis ofthe symbolic elements ofthe physician-patient relationship suggests that a clinical approach that makes the illness experience more understandable to the patient, that instills a sense of caring and social support, and that increases a feeling of mastery and control over the course of the illness, will be most likely to create a positive placebo response and to improve symptoms (24, 26, 29) , Empirical support for this thesis is provided by a study of the effect of the anesthesiology pre-operative visit on postoperative pain. The control group received a standard visit whereas the experimental group received teaching about the nature of postoperative pain, advice on simple techniques to avoid pain and increase relaxation, and reassurance that back-up medication was available from the nurses. The experimental group required half as much pain medication and were able to be discharged an average of 2 days earlier. These investigators (72)-who used no inert substances and who committed no deceptions on the subjects-described their results as illustrating "a placebo effect without a placebo," Once clinicians realize the extent to which simple information and encouragement can elicit a positive placebo response and thus supplement the pharmacologic effects of any active medication, the perceived need to use deception or inert medication in clinical practice ought to be markedly diminished.
Conclusion
The placebo, as traditionally used, could be called the lie that heals. But a satisfactory understanding of the nature of the placebo effect shows that the healing comes not from the lie itself, but rather from the relationship between healer and patient, and the latter's own capacity for self-healing via symbolic and psychological approaches as well as via biological intervention.
For some time medical science has looked almost exclusively at technical means of diagnosis and treatment; the doctor-patient relationship that forms the setting for their application has been naively viewed as a noncontributory background factor, relegated to the amorphous realm of the "art of medicine," or simply ignored. In this setting, the placebo effect has inevitably been viewed as a nuisance variable, interfering with our ability to elicit "clean data" from clinical trials; and deception in medicine has been seen either as an unimportant side issue or as a tolerated means toward another end. But, as the doctor-patient relationship is rediscovered as a worthy focus for medical research and medical education, the placebo efFect assumes center stage as one approach to a more sophisticated understanding of this relationship (73) . Deception is avoided, as ethically inappropriate and as a threat to the long-term stability of the relationship; and clinicians turn to alternative, nondeceptive ways to elicit positive placebo responses in all patient encounters at the same time that they apply the most appropriate medical technology.
